|
EDITOR'S NOTE
The
Saudi-American Forum is very pleased to present excerpts from
the new book Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global
Jihad by Natana J. DeLong-Bas. Today we present
excerpts from chapter one of the book and will follow with other excerpts over the coming weeks.
In addition to reading the excerpts we hope you will join a a discussion of the book
and view the additional material about Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global
Jihad.
Click
here
to read the introduction to the book.
Related
Material:
Click
here
for ordering information.
Wahhabi
Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad
By Natana J. DeLong-Bas
EXCERPTS
FROM CHAPTER ONE
MUHAMMAD
IBN ABD AL-WAHHAB AND THE ORIGINS OF WAHHABISM: THE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONTEXT
Pages 8-13
Setting
the Stage: The
Eighteenth-Century Context
Wahhabism
was neither a historical aberration nor an isolated phenomenon.
It did not arise in a vacuum.
In fact, Wahhabism reflects some of the most important
trends in eighteenth-century Islamic thought, underscoring the
interactions and exchanges that took place between Muslims in
cosmopolitan regions like the Hijaz.
The fact that Wahhabism so clearly reflects major trends
of thought apparent in other contemporary reform movements
suggests that it was neither "innovative" nor
"heretical." Rather,
it can more appropriately be viewed as part of mainstream
eighteenth-century Islamic thought, although somewhat tailored
to its specific context.
The
eighteenth-century is often described as the century of renewal
and reform in Islam, a time when revivalist movements of various
types arose in a variety of locations. [2]
Although each movement had its own specific
characteristics, reflecting the environments and contests in
which they arose, eighteenth-century revival and reform
movements share some common themes and emphases.
Unlike the movements of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, which arose in response to external aggressions, like
European imperialism, or the desire for political independence,
the movements of the eighteenth century arose largely in
response to internal conditions.
The most important of these was the perceived
deterioration in Muslim beliefs and practices.
For
eighteenth-century reformers, one of the major signs of the
deterioration of Islam was the adoption of rituals and beliefs
from other religions, like praying to saints and believing that
saints could grant blessings or perform miracles.
In some cases, people had adopted superstitious
practices, like spitting in a particular way or wearing charms
to ward off evil spirits. Reformers
were puzzled and perturbed by these practices, particularly when
they were accompanied by a failure to respect Muslim rituals and
prayers. They
wondered whether the people engaged in these activities knew why
they were doing so or what such actions symbolized.
Some questioned whether a person engaged in such
activities could still be considered a Muslim since their
actions reflected a belief that people and things other than God
possessed the power to grant requests or provide protection.
This
was a serious matter because the major distinctive doctrine of
Islam is belief in absolute monotheism (tawhid).
In Islam, God alone is considered to be worthy of worship
and prayer. This
belief is reflected in the defining act of the Muslim, the
declaration of faith that proclaims, "I believe that there
is no god but The God and that Muhammad is the Messenger of
God." Consequently,
failure to act in accordance with this proclamation of faith
opened the door to questions about the person's status as a
Muslim. It was for this reason that the revival and reform movements
of the eighteenth century adamantly insisted that a "return"
to monotheism was the necessary first step in reforming Islam.
This meant getting rid of foreign and superstitious
beliefs and practices. Wahhabism
shared this common concern and goal, becoming famous for its
strict adherence to absolute monotheism (tawhid).
However,
this was only a fist step.
Eighteenth-century reformers believed that adherence to
absolute monotheism (tawhid) had implications beyond
private religious beliefs.
They believed that adherence to absolute monotheism (tawhid)
should also be reflected in public life by placing God at the
center of the political order.
Theoretically, this meant recognizing God as the creator
and sustainer of all life and as the ultimate sovereign and
lawgiver. Practically,
it meant reimplementing Islamic law (Sharia) as the law of the
land. Eighteenth-century
reformers believed that this restoration of God to the center of
Muslim public life was the key to recovering the power and
prestige that Muslims had enjoyed in the past during the rules
of the great empires and caliphates.
In
general, reformers did not seek to implement their goals by
overthrowing the current regimes or insisting that their reforms
be applied from the top down by force or government decree. Instead, they believed that reform should be a process,
beginning at the grassroots level and moving gradually upward
through society as peoples' private ethical and moral beliefs,
grounded in their religion, influenced decision making and
public conduct. In
this way, adherence to absolute monotheism (tawhid) was
intended to launch the second goal of the reformers, the
sociomoral reconstruction of society.
In
addition to adherence to absolute monotheism (tawhid),
eighteenth-century reformers called for a return to the
fundamentals of faith -- the Muslim scriptures of the Quran (the
word of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad) and the hadith
(records of the sayings and deeds of Muhammad) -- as the sources
of guidance that would lead to the sociomoral reconstruction of
society. This
emphasis on the return to fundamentals made the reformists the
original Muslim fundamentalists in the same way that
nineteenth-century Christian movements dedicated to a "return"
to the Bible were the original Christian fundamentalists.
There was nothing inherently militant or violent about
this return, nor did it necessarily imply a literal
interpretation of the scriptures.
It was simply an attempt to move away from centuries of
historical interpretations and accretions in favor of direct
study and interpretation of the scriptures.
The
dual emphasis of the eighteenth-century reformers on the Quran
and hadith was neither unusual nor revolutionary.
Muslims believe that the Quran and hadith are
complementary. The
Quran, as God's Word, is a statement of God's will for all
humanity. Although it contains some legal prescriptions, it is not a
lawbook. Rather,
the Quran provides moral and ethical guidance and values that
human beings are supposed to apply in their personal and public
lives, individually and communally.
The hadith provide practical advice on how this is
to be done.
Muslims
do not worship Muhammad or believe that he is God.
Throughout history, they have emphasized that Muhammad
was strictly a human being, although they believe that he was
the most perfect of human beings.
It is precisely because he was a real human being living
in the real world in which love and war, family and marital
relations, business and commercial transactions, and local and
international relations exist that his example is so important
for Muslims to study.
Muslims
believe that Muhammad's life reflects the perfect living out of
the teachings and values of the Quran. Consequently, whenever a question arises about how one should
respond to a given situation, they turn to the hadith to see how
Muhammad reacted. Although
some Muslims have taken Muhammad's example very literally, for
example, wearing their beards exactly like he did, most do not
believe that such strict, literal adherence is necessary or even
desirable. Rather,
many point to his attitudes and values, such as respect for
women, caring for the poor and orphans, and support for social
justice, as the correct examples to follow.
The
reformers shared the belief that Muhammad's example was very
important for Muslims to follow.
Consequently, the third major characteristic of the
reform movements was a renewed emphasis on the study of the hadith
but in a new way. Eighteenth-century
studies of hadith differed from studies of the past
because they focused on the content of the hadith rather
than their chains of transmission.
This represented a major break from the past tradition of
hadith study and authentication.
Although
the reformers believed that authentication of the chain of
transmitters was an important first step in determining the
potential authenticity of a hadith, they believed that
verification of the chain was insufficient by itself.
They recognized the potential for fabrication not only of
the chains of transmitters but also of the content.
Consequently, they believed that the content of the hadith
should also be examined to determine whether its message was
consistent with the message of the Quran.
They reasoned that the Quran and hadith should be
in agreement with respect to their content and the values they
embodied because they were supposed to serve as complimentary
sources of scripture. Thus,
if a hadith had a strong chain of transmitters but
contradicted the teachings of the Quran, the reformers believed
that it should be declared inauthentic.
The Wahhabis were important with respect to this new
methodology because the written works of their founder and
ideologue, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, are an excellent and
compelling example of its use.
The Wahhabis also became well known for their travels
throughout the Muslim world in search of hadith
collections. [4]
This
new content-driven methodology of hadith criticism tied
in directly to the reformists' goal of the regeneration of
Muslim society through the return to scripture because it
offered a new way to interpret and understand it.
These reformers did not seek to re-create literally the
early Muslim community, as some later movements tried to do. [5]
Rather, the goal was to rediscover the meaning of the hadith
in their original context in order to determine the eternal
value or ethical guideline contained within it. [6]
This value or guideline was then compared to Quranic
teachings about the same, setting the stage not only for a more
profound understanding of Islam but also for a more meaningful
application of Islamic values in both the private and public
spheres. Thus, this
new methodology of studying the Quran and hadith was not
just an intellectual exercise.
It had very practical implications for daily life, for
both individuals and the broader Muslim community.
In the
more than one thousand years that had passed since the death of
Muhammad, religious and legal scholars had written innumerable
commentaries, analyses, and exegetical studies of the
scriptures. Particularly
important among these works were those that detailed and
elaborated upon Islamic law.
Similar to the role of the law in Judaism, Islamic law
plays an important role in Muslim life. The Quran declares that the correct living out of faith (orthopraxy)
is a necessary corollary to correctness of belief (orthodoxy).
In other words, while it is important to have correct
religious beliefs, it is even more important to live a life that
reflects those beliefs. The
Quran teaches that at the end of time human beings will be
judged not on the sole basis of what they believe but on how
they lived their lives. However,
the Quran is not a lawbook along the lines of the Old Testament
books like Leviticus and Deuteronomy, which outline long series
of exacting legal prescriptions.
Rather, the Quran provides moral and ethical values and
guidelines, which Muslim legal experts have elaborated and
detailed for application. While
this scholarship was one of the most important contributions and
efforts of early Muslim scholars, this process was understood to
have been largely completed under the Abbasid Empire (750-1258
C.E.). Although
there were always some independent jurists who continued to
interpret the law on their own, a practice called ijtihad,
the guidelines and teachings of the early legal specialists were
broadly accepted and utilized intact until the eighteenth
century, a practice known as taqlid. [7]
Eighteenth-century
reformers were concerned by taqlid because they perceived
that these interpretations had come to be considered as
authoritative as the scriptures.
Over time, students and scholars had begun to place a
heavier emphasis on study and knowledge of the commentaries and
interpretations of past scholars than on direct study of the
scriptures.
The
reformers believed that this practice was inappropriate.
They pointed to the fact that interpretations and
commentaries often reflected the context in which they were
written, both geographical and political, rather than the
context in which the scriptures were revealed and originally
understood. They
questioned whether one interpretation of a legal or religious
matter could truly be authoritative for every time and place, as
had been claimed by past scholars.
Concluding that this could not be the case, they called
on each generation and context to be responsible for revisiting
the scriptures directly for fresh interpretation.
The promotion and exercise of ijtihad therefore
became another defining characteristic of eighteenth-century
reform movements.
The
reformers understood their movements to be a process that would
necessarily occur gradually.
They were evolutionary, not revolutionary, in approach.
In general, the movements did not seek to topple
governments, engage in coups to replace one political system
with another, or organize their followers into cells to carry
out terrorist activities or guerrilla warfare against existing
governments. They
did align themselves with political leaders, but their purpose
in doing so was not overtly political. [8]
What mattered to the reformers was that the political
system in place reflected and supported Islam in both private
and public life. They
were more concerned with matters of religious practice and
adherence to Islamic law than with political systems or
geographic boundaries.
The
reformers sought to implement a two-tiered approach to the
sociomoral reconstruction of society.
At the grassroots level, they sought to continually add
to the number of their followers, believing that this was the
level at which real change needed to occur.
Once individuals began to reform their religious beliefs
and practices, it was expected that these private beliefs would
have a broad impact on public behavior.
At the same time, the reformers were practical enough to
anticipate popular resistance to the proposed reforms because
they represented a change not only in beliefs but also in
behaviors at both the private and public levels.
Consequently, the reformers sought protection and
assistance from local political leaders.
According to this arrangement, the political leaders
acted as protectors who ensured that the religious teachings of
the reformers were respected and implemented.
In return, the reformers supported the political rule of
their protectors and provided religious legitimation for it. [9]
There
were times when military activity occurred under this
arrangement, particularly when issues of self-defense arose.
However, jihad as holy war was not the primary purpose of
the eighteenth-century reform movements.
The reformers were not engaged in battles for
independence, the end to colonial rule, or global jihad.
Engagement in jihad as holy war was not one of the
movements' defining characteristics.
If anything, their downplaying of jihad as holy war
distinguished them from the independence movements of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which specifically called
for jihad as holy war in order to shake off colonial overlords
or respond to other aggressions.
One
final hallmark of eighteenth-century reform movements was the
fact that they were inspired and led by scholars (ulama)
rather than lay activists, as is so often the case in the
contemporary era. This
does not mean that there was a broad consensus among all ulama
that reforms were necessary.
In fact, some of the strongest opposition to the reform
movements came from the ulama, typically those who held a
position within the official religious establishment. These establishment ulama often owned their positions
to nepotism and the sale of offices rather than to their
scholarly achievements. As
a result, they were often more interested in maintaining their
own power bases than in the "correct" practice and
interpretation of Islam. The reformers, on the other hand, tended to either occupy the
lower echelons of the religious establishment or stand outside
it altogether, often enjoying mass popularity rather than
government favor. Consequently,
a subtheme of the reform movements was opposition to
reform-minded scholars by establishment ulama, who
supported a continuation of the status quo in order to maintain
their own positions of power.
Terms:
-
tawhid
- absolute monotheism
-
hadith
- records of the sayings and deeds of Muhammad
-
ijtihad - independent reasoning in the interpretation of
Islamic law
-
taqlid - imitation of past interpretations of Islamic law
-
ulama - scholars
|
Wahhabi
Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad
By Natana J. DeLong-Bas
Book
Description
Before
9/11, few Westerners had heard of Wahhabism. Today, it
is a household word. Frequently mentioned in association
with Osama bin Laden, Wahhabism is portrayed by the
media and public officials as an intolerant,
puritanical, militant interpretation of Islam that calls
for the wholesale destruction of the West in a jihad of
global proportions. In the first study ever undertaken
of the writings of Wahhabism's founder, Muhammad Ibn Abd
al-Wahhab (1702-1791), Natana DeLong-Bas shatters these
stereotypes and misconceptions.
[more]
Click
here
for ordering information. |
|
Natana J.
DeLong-Bas is a senior research assistant at the
Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown
University, Washington, DC.
She is the author of Notable Muslims:
A Biographical Dictionary (2004) and co-author
of Women in Muslim Family Law, revised edition,
with John L. Esposito (2001).
She has served as editor for and contributor to The
Oxford Dictionary of Islam (OUP, 2003), and
contributor to The Encyclopedia of the Qur'an
(2004) and The Encyclopedia of the Islamic World (OUP,
2004). She is a frequent public speaker on Islam, Wahhabism and
Saudi Arabia.
|
|