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EDITOR'S NOTE
This article was originally
published by The
Washington Post on May 25, 2004 and is reprinted
with permission.
The "oil
crisis" of 2004 is one more sign that a Bush administration
that once hoped to transform the sources of instability in the
Middle East is instead retrenching to a messier version of the
old status quo.
Desperate to slow the
recent rise in oil prices, finance ministers from the Group of
Eight
industrialized countries last weekend demanded that OPEC
countries raise their production, arguing in their communique
that "lower oil prices would be of benefit to the whole
world economy." Since Saudi Arabia is the only OPEC
country
with much spare capacity, that put the kingdom back in the
familiar position of receiving entreaties from skittish
Europeans, Japanese and Americans.
The Saudis responded graciously enough, and why not? They are in
the driver's seat. Saudi Oil Minister Ali Naimi promised that
the kingdom would pump an additional 600,000 barrels a day,
boosting its output to 9.1 million barrels daily. And Saudi
sources have been hinting that they're prepared to go further --
up to the kingdom's current maximum of about 10.5 million
barrels a day.
To underline Saudi Arabia's decisive role in the oil market,
Saudi officials were telling insiders at an International Energy
Agency
meeting in Amsterdam yesterday that over the next several
years, they may increase their maximum capacity to 11.5 million
or 12 million barrels per day -- to maintain their preferred
excess-capacity buffer of 2 million barrels a day above planned
production.
In this week's frantic market, even the
Saudi offers to boost production haven't significantly
pushed prices down. But analysts expect that as the market
steadies,
prices will fall
several dollars from yesterday's record futures-market close
of $41.72 a barrel.
The drama on the oil spot market has masked the fact that the
recent price squeeze has been building for several years -- and
is largely a result of conflicting policy decisions made in
Washington and Riyadh. A rapidly growing Chinese economy meant
that upward pressure on prices was inevitable. But neither the
Saudis nor the Americans took appropriate steps to defuse the
problem before it became a crisis.
The Bush administration contributed to the oil price squeeze in
several ways, according to industry experts. First, it failed to
address the fact that demand for gasoline in the United States
was increasing sharply, thanks to ever more gas guzzlers on the
road and longer commutes. The administration also continued
pumping 120,000 barrels a day of crude into the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve, making a tight market even tighter. And by
letting the value of the dollar fall sharply over the past year,
the White House all but forced the Saudis to raise
dollar-denominated oil prices to compensate.
The administration's more serious mistake was that as energy
supplies tightened, it did nothing to reduce U.S. demand. A year
when the United States was fighting a war in Iraq would have
been an ideal time to ask the country to sacrifice a bit, to
reduce its dependence on oil from the Middle East. Instead, the
Bush administration let SUV Nation roll on.
Meanwhile, as Americans burned their energy, the Saudis subtly
fiddled with the oil market. By keeping inventories low and
encouraging a policy of "just in time" deliveries to
refiners, they kept spot prices on a knife edge. The result was
that OPEC, after years of powerlessness, became in effect a
central bank for oil.
"U.S. policymakers are guilty of denial," says Roger
Diwan, a managing director of PFC
Energy, a Washington-based
consulting firm. "Tighter specifications for refiners,
runaway demand and supply bottlenecks have indeed created market
tightness. Blaming the producers doesn't solve the problems
created by contradictory U.S. energy policies over the last two
decades."
Bush administration officials who talked blithely in the run-up
to the Iraq war about replacing Saudi Arabia as the locus of the
oil market should be forced to drink a barrel of crude. As
things have turned out, events have underlined the inevitability
of Saudi Arabia as the supplier of last resort. An
administration that set out to transform the Saudi-dependent
status quo has ended up reinforcing it -- at the very time that
terrorist attacks are showing the kingdom's vulnerability.
Conspiracy theorists will see these developments in oil markets
as further evidence of a plot between the House of Saud and the
House of Bush. That's nonsense. What we are seeing in the market
is a result of clever policies in Saudi Arabia and dumb ones in
the United States. This "crisis" is man-made, and the
more it resembles the oil-crisis frenzy of the 1970s, the more
nervous we should all be.
RESOURCES: Global
Oil Supply: Saudi Arabia -- A Conference Hosted at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies:
U.S.-Saudi
Relations and Global Energy Security Conference:
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Part
1 - Ali Al-Naimi, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral
Resources
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Part
2 - Kyle McSlarrow, Deputy Secretary of Energy, U.S. Energy
Department
-
Part
3 - Guy
Caruso, Administrator, Energy Information Administration
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Part
4 - Abdallah S. Ju'mah, President and CEO of Saudi Aramco
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Part
5 - Rex
W. Tillerson, President, Exxon Mobil Corporation
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Part
6 - Ibrahim
Al-Assaf, Minister of Finance
-
Part
7 - James
Wolfensohn, President, The World Bank
Saudi
Arabia - Country Analysis Brief (EIA)
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