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Item of Interest
Executive Summary Before September 11, 2001, U.S.
Consular Corps visa processes in many countries functioned with
inadequate oversight and lax quality control. Some DS-156 forms submitted by the 15 hijackers to Consular
Officers in Saudi Arabia were illegible and incomplete.
However, visas were granted without interviews or
background checks. We
can now say with certainty that U.S. visa procedures failed
Americans on at least 15 separate occasions in Saudi Arabia. Fortunately, new procedures
overseen by the Department of Homeland Security present more
rigorous and thorough procedures, which protect both U.S. and
Saudi security interests. Visa
procedures that function efficiently and effectively have
immense consequences for the United States and Saudi Arabia.
If new procedures turn away desirable Saudi visitors, U.S.
education, business travel and tourism industries could easily
lose an estimated $4.7 billion in travel revenue over the next
decade. More
importantly, if the United States does not proactively
communicate that America is still open to Saudi business;
long-term social, cultural and indirect benefits from economic
bonds woven into the U.S.-Saudi relationship could unravel and
fray. U.S. Visas for Terrorists,
Wherein lies the Blame?
"To
them who are here in the room, to those who are watching
on television, your government failed you, those entrusted
with protecting you failed you and I failed you. We tried
hard, but that doesn't matter because we failed. Richard Clarke’s blanket apology cannot cover U.S. Consular Corps officers stationed in Saudi Arabia. Procedures for processing student and tourist visas for 15 of the 9/11 hijackers were ignored or not followed prior to visas being granted. Images of the DS-156 forms submitted by the hijackers (published in the magazine National Review) reveal scribbled and incomplete documents no conscientious American bureaucrat in any organ of government should have accepted. No clarifications on the data were sought by U.S. Consular Officers, and no personal follow up interviews were ever conducted. It has become clear that unlike Richard Clarke, U.S. Consular Officers were not "trying hard." Their lack of attention to procedures and quality control meant they were destined to fail at some point in time. For Americans and Saudis, the repercussion of this failure continues to reverberate. The attacks provided an opening for a multitude of actors already poised and waiting to spin 9/11 toward terminating U.S.-Saudi relations, intercultural exchanges, trade and travel. A new industry of Saudi bashing books and hate radio programs is one 9/11 social and market legacy. On the visa front, a multitude of restrictive new visa procedures, rigorously and sometimes painfully enforced, have now replaced the largely ignored original procedures. Friction from new restrictions may have actually deterred otherwise eager visitors from entering the United States. Likewise, lingering concerns about the air travel in general and the safety of Saudi travel in the United States has caused a decline in Saudi visits to the United States.
Exhibit
#1 Saudi
Visitors to the United States during Selected Years
ADD
The 9/11 Visa Fallout Striking the right balance
between enforced visa application processes and efficiently
approving the visits of the vast majority of Saudi Arabian
citizens, who pose no threat to the United States, has been a
challenge. After
9/11, the U.S. State Department announced a new extended visa
waiting period. It
states that all men between the ages of 16 and 45 from countries
with large Arab and Muslim populations will be subject to a
longer waiting period on nonimmigrant visa applications.
It imposed a more rigorous review of Arabs and Muslim men
specifically, and the Saudis in particular. New visa procedures
are now applied to applicants who cannot meet the nonimmigrant
intent requirements as well as to all Saudi males.
As a result, many legitimate Saudi businessmen and the
much larger share of Saudi visitors, who are students and
tourists, have been forced to alter, and in some cases,
partially cancel their plans to come to the United States. (See
exhibit #2)
ADD New procedures, as one official
put it, created "a substantial fall-off" of Saudi
visitors to the United States.
It is even more certain the new perceptual barriers that
delay or prevent Saudis from coming into the United States are
harmful to the long-term interests of the Unites States. Long lines at the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia, waiting four
to six weeks to obtain a visa, personal slights and ill
treatment at U.S. airports, and safety concerns directly
undermine ongoing trade, bilateral finance and cultural
exchanges. However
inconvenient this is for the Saudis, Americans interested in
revitalizing longstanding service export relationships are also
highly concerned. The Economic Impact of
U.S.-Saudi Visa Policy In 2004, 124,000 U.S. service
and manufacturing jobs are directly related to U.S.-Saudi trade.
The IRmep forecasts that the worst case loss in travel
related services, education and tourism revenue (excluding
airfare or special expenditures such as healthcare visits) could
reach U.S. $4.7 billion between 2002-2011.
This scenario assumes that Saudi visits are not
rejuvenated by new outreach programs.
(See exhibit 3) ADD
Exhibit
#3 2002-2011 Worst Case Scenario Lost Saudi Travel Revenue
Temporary visitors from Saudi
Arabia grew on average 2% per year in the 1980s and 1990s.
The 2002 visitor decline reversed a stable and reliable
growth trend. If
this new trend were to be reinforced by a combination of waning
demand, fear of travel in the United States and truly
restrictive permanent U.S. visa procedures, we could anticipate
a continued -11% average annual growth rate in Saudi visitors
over the next decade. This
would reduce total Saudi visits from 30 million in 2002 to 10
million by the year 2011. ADD
Exhibit
#4 Forecast 2002-2011 Saudi Visitor Worst Case Scenario Few Americans or Saudis would
wish to enable this type of decade long "lose-lose"
trend. Some U.S.
government leaders have already rushed to assure the Saudis that
they are welcome in the United States.
The U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Robert
Jordan, stated in November 2001 that, "he was of the view
that the U.S. visa policy on nonimmigrant and for business has
to change, that Saudi businessmen are welcome in the United
States." Additionally,
William Lash III, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce, in a
trip to Saudi Arabia in November 2001 made an appeal to Saudi
businessmen to travel to the United States.
Mr. Lash asserted that he is willing to escort Saudi
businessmen wanting to do business in the United States. This
offer, while intended to be helpful, begs the question about why
any Saudi or other international businessperson should need a
special escort to the United States. It also misses another equally important and more
numerous U.S. interest -- foreign students and tourists. Saudi business executives
accounted for 12.6% of total visitors. Students and their families were 33.5% for temporary
visitors, though their overall numbers have dropped in U.S.
colleges and universities.
However, conditions for a recovery have improved as
universities reach out to Saudi Arabia through focused
recruitment. Universities
in this case may be illuminating the path toward success for
tourism and other American travel service industries.
In the 9/11 aftermath, many foreign students were not
sure that if they leave the United States to visit their
families for the summer, that they will be allowed to return to
resume and complete their studies.
Universities and international student associations have
worked hard to ensure that students will not find themselves in
limbo with no choice but to enroll in a new institution in a
different country. Universities
worry about declines in student body diversity. The economic benefit of efficient, effective visa processes
for students and other travelers is also clear.
Attracting and keeping a flow of these visitors
will help restore previous visitor levels and resumption of the
historic 2% annual visitor growth rate.
ADD An accelerated recovery and growth resumption strategy necessitates communication campaigns targeting business and tourist visitors in Saudi Arabia. These types of communications, driven by private business associations and the U.S. government, should communicate the key messages and value propositions clearly: America wants students and trainees back in American classrooms, executives in U.S. boardrooms and tourists in Disneyland. Americans already know there is no better land for tourism and business. The challenge is to communicate this to the Saudis. Efficient and effective visa processes and a "welcome wagon" communications campaign is not only the right thing to do, it would also create $5.7 billion in U.S. travel revenue over the decade. ADD
Exhibit
#6 2002-2011 Forecast Travel Revenue Recovery Scenario
The United States and Saudi
Arabia continue to face many global challenges. However, big challenges are effectively confronted by
broadening and amplifying the lines of communication.
Closing the door on the Saudis, or letting them think
we’ve closed the door, is not the way forward.
It is also not the American way.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Tanya
C. Hsu is a senior analyst of Middle East political
economy at the Institute
for Research: Middle Eastern Policy.
Ms. Hsu analyzes the role of Western States in mediating
between the Arab world, the United States and Europe. For
almost two decades she has created and facilitated
strong connections between Middle Eastern leaders,
diplomats and business men and women. As a senior
research analyst and consultant, she continues an active
role to promote progress, both economic and political,
between the region and the United States.
Ms. Hsu holds
an Economics degree from the University of London. Ms.
Hsu's analysis has been published in the US, Europe and
the Middle East, including Al Ahram, and the Media
Monitors Network. She appears on Palestinian, Jordanian
and British television and radio as well as within the
United States. Ms Hsu was an organizer of the 2003
Harvard Symposium "Promoting Understanding between
the Arab World and the U.S.", and serves on the
Board of the Atlanta Chapter of the American-Arab Anti
Discrimination Committee. Ms Hsu worked for ten years as
a financial advisor serving clients in the United
Kingdom and United States.
Hassan Elkhalil, Esq. practices Immigration Law in Atlanta Georgia.
Mr. Elkhalil has B.S. in Business Administration
from the American University of Beirut, a B.A. in
Political Science from the University of Tennessee, a
Juris Doctor from John Marshall Law School, and the LL.M.
from the University of Missouri, Columbia school of law.
Mr. Elkhalil has written previous articles on
civil rights and immigration, and currently is working
on a book titled “The Law of Nations.” Mr. Elkhalil
can be reached at email address: hassan@elkhalillaw.com
Grant
F. Smith is the Director of the Institute for
Research: Middle Eastern Policy (IRMEP) in Washington
, Preceding his
tenure at Yankee Group, Smith taught graduate level
finance and marketing courses for five years at
Colombia's most prestigious business school, the Colegio
de Estudios Superiores de Adminstración (CESA). He
coordinated executive seminars, exchanges, simulations
and programs between CESA and Harvard, Berkeley, and
other Smith received
his Master's degree in International Management from the
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