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Executive
Summary
[Part
I]
The
events
of
9/11
have
altered
our
vision
of
the
future
and
they
have
done
the
same
for
our
perception
of
the
past.
Our
psychological
inability
to
associate
al
Qaeda
with
CIA
influences
in
its
creation
has
forced
us,
mostly
through
the
mainstream
media,
to
link
the
organization
with
another
nation:
Saudi
Arabia.
However,
the
purported
links
between
the
Kingdom
and
al
Qaeda
can
be
either
dismissed
or
explained
differently
once
an
informed,
objective
perspective
is
used.
Furthermore,
the
alleged
association
between
al
Qaeda
and
the
Kingdom’s
government
is
even
more
absurd
when
one
realizes
that
the
Saudi
government
and
al
Qaeda
are
equally
and
fundamentally
in
combat
against
each
other.
So,
while
many
may
point
to
Saudi
participation
in
the
Afghani
conflict
as
evidence
of
its
willingness
to
promote
extremist
Islam,
their
role
was,
in
fact,
a
defensive
one
aimed
at
protecting
itself
from
just
such
militancy.
In
"The
Crucibles:
9/11,
Afghanistan
and
the
Fashioning
of
a
Foe,"
Gregory
Dowling
examines
these
important
perceptions
and
links
that
shape
the
current
dialogue
on
US-Saudi
relations.
The
Saudi-American
Forum
is
pleased
to
present
Mr.
Dowling's
essay,
distributed
in
two
parts.
FOR
PART
II
OF
THIS
ESSAY
-
CLICK
HERE
The
Crucibles: 9/11, Afghanistan
and the Fashioning of a Foe [Part I]
By
Gregory
J. H. Dowling
Regret
what?
The
secret
operation
was
an
excellent
idea.
It
had
the
effect
of
drawing
the
Russians
into
the
Afghan
trap…What
is
more
important
to
the
history
of
the
world?
…Some
stirred
up
Moslems
or
the
liberation
of
Central
Europe
and
the
end
of
the
cold
war?
-
Zbigniew
Brzezinski
1
Things
fall
apart;
the
center
cannot
hold;
Mere
anarchy
is
loosed
upon
the
world,
The
blood-dimmed
tide
is
loosed,
and
everywhere
The
ceremony
of
innocence
is
drowned.
-
William
Butler
Yeats
2
History
is
an
insistent
force:
the
past
is
what
put
us
where
we
are.
-
William
Pfaff
3
Searching
for
an
Enemy
to
Fit
the
Crime…
September
11th
2001
confirmed
terrorism's
power
not
only
to
inflict
horrific
personal
and
material
loss
but,
and
this
is
arguably
its
most
important
legacy,
to
dramatically
influence
perceptions.
In
a
very
real
sense,
the
United
States
remains
hostage
to
9/11
-
the
event
dominates
our
contemporary
political
life
to
the
point
of
defining
it.
It
has
galvanized
substantive
changes
to
the
nation's
domestic
politics
just
as
it
has
become
the
primary
portal
through
which
we
view
the
country's
foreign
policy
challenges.
And
while
9/11
has
altered
the
approach
to
our
nation's
future,
it
has
equally
affected
the
approach
to
its
past,
compromising
the
ability
to
assess
objectively
and
comprehensively
the
genesis
and
nature
of
the
threat.
That
our
understanding
should
be
impaired
reflects
9/11's
power
over
the
nation's
imagination.
The
event
is
seen
as
a
singular
event,
one
that
marked
a
calamitous
break
with
the
past;
it
was
the
day
that
"the
world
changed
forever."
Despite
the
fact
that
New
York
City
endured
a
precursor
in
1993,
the
level
of
destruction
and
the
extent
of
the
deaths
eight
years
later
sharply
distinguished
the
two
events,
provoking
an
overwhelming
sense
of
vulnerability
not
experienced
in
the
preceding
attack.
This
heightened
sense
of
vulnerability
was
not,
however,
simply
a
function
of
the
extent
of
the
carnage.
Rather,
it
stemmed
from
the
realization
that
the
perpetrators
had
turned
key
characteristics
of
our
society
-
our
openness
and
the
technologies
that
frame
our
daily
lives
-
against
us.
What
we
had
heretofore
understood
as
fundamental
strengths
were
destructively
and
unnervingly
inverted
into
significant
weaknesses.4
Critically,
9/11
was
internalized
as
an
attack
on
our
very
way
of
life.
The
identification
of
al
Qaeda
as
the
organization
behind
the
attack
reinforced
this
perspective.
9/11
was
quickly
perceived
to
be
an
expression
of
an
inherently
brutal
organization
motivated
by
an
aggressively
militant
and
politicized
Islam,
and
dedicated,
according
to
its
pronouncements,
to
reconstituting
the
'ummah,
a
supranational
and
idealized
Islamic
community
in
which
Islamic
law
would
be
strictly
applied.
The
group's
unremitting
hostility
to
the
United
States
was
seen
as
a
reflection
not
so
much
of
what
the
country
had
done
in
the
world
but
as
a
reaction
to
it's
very
presence
in
the
world
as
a
powerful
cultural
and
secularizing
force.
Accordingly,
9/11
was
portrayed
as
the
opening
salvo
in
a
new
ideological
conflict
grounded
in
alternate
and
irreconcilable
visions
of
what
should
be
the
dominant
social
norm.
It
was
an
act
of
such
unconscionable,
murderous
violence
that
any
reference
to
the
role
of
U.S.
policy
in
creating
the
conditions
that
gave
rise
to
such
terror
are
quickly
and
harshly
dismissed
as
equivalent
to
legitimating
the
terrorists.
While
the
perspective
of
al
Qaeda
as
implacably
opposed
to
the
United
States
has
certain
validity,
assessing
this
terrorist
threat
primarily
if
not
solely
as
one
grounded
in
inherently
opposed
social
orders,
as
the
U.S.
media
has
done,
skews
analysis.
Critically,
it
works
to
exclude
from
the
discussion
any
substantive
reference
to
U.S.
policy
and
historical
context.
The
notion
that
our
policies
and
their
implementation
by
the
CIA
are
less
than
germane
to
evaluating
al
Qaeda
is
underpinned
by
the
very
nature
of
9/11.
It
was
an
act
of
such
unconscionable,
murderous
violence
that
any
reference
to
the
role
of
U.S.
policy
in
creating
the
conditions
that
gave
rise
to
such
terror
are
quickly
and
harshly
dismissed
as
equivalent
to
legitimating
the
terrorists.
Equally
important,
such
an
analytical
approach
commits
to
an
interpretation
of
al
Qaeda
as
a
representation
of
a
particular
type
of
social
order
rather
than
as
an
autonomous
agent
with
its
own
distinct
evolution.
…And
Finding
the
Wrong
One
...given
that
the
majority
of
the
terrorists
who
participated
in
9/11
were
Saudi
nationals
and
that
the
public
face
of
al
Qaeda,
Usama
bin
Laden,
was
Saudi-born
as
well,
it
was
inevitable
that
a
torrent
of
accusatory
commentary
would
be
unleashed
in
the
U.S.
media
towards
the
Kingdom.
The
weakness
of
this
interpretive
approach
is
nowhere
more
evident
than
in
the
concerted
and
persistent
effort
to
directly
link
Saudi
Arabia
to
the
terror.
Of
course,
given
that
the
majority
of
the
terrorists
who
participated
in
9/11
were
Saudi
nationals
and
that
the
public
face
of
al
Qaeda,
Usama
bin
Laden,
was
Saudi-born
as
well,
it
was
inevitable
that
a
torrent
of
accusatory
commentary
would
be
unleashed
in
the
U.S.
media
towards
the
Kingdom.
Nor
should
one
be
particularly
surprised,
at
least
at
the
outset,
with
the
tone
and
form
that
the
phenomenon
of
'Saudi-bashing'
took:
the
shrill
condemnation
of
Saudi
society
in
toto.
The
response
mirrored
the
U.S.
public's
highly
charged
sense
that
its
own
society
was
under
generalized
attack.
However,
as
the
U.S.
media
sought
to
'connect
the
dots'
for
the
American
public
and
display
the
full
shape
of
the
foe,
the
resulting
image
was
more
fabulist
than
factual.
In
order
to
make
the
Kingdom
out
to
be
al
Qaeda's
wellspring,
not
only
were
central
aspects
of
the
Kingdom's
social
order
obscured
but
the
Kingdom's
role
in
the
war
of
resistance
to
the
Soviet
invasion
of
Afghanistan
was
distorted.
Questioning
the
Caricature
of
the
Kingdom
The
picture
drawn
of
the
Kingdom
by
much
of
the
media
commentary
is
nothing
less
than
a
'rogue
state'
with
al
Qaeda
as
the
Kingdom's
willful
alter
ego
-
devious,
deviant
and
dangerous
-
enabling
the
Kingdom
to
play
a
duplicitous
'double-game',
using
while
simultaneously
abusing
the
United
States.
However,
such
caricature
invites
more
questions
than
it
answers
and
ignores
points
that
challenge
it.
If
al
Qaeda
is
so
intimately
linked
to
Saudi
Arabian
society
as
so
much
of
the
media
coverage
implies,
that
begs
the
question
as
to
why
it
has
been
unable
to
develop
a
secure
base
of
operations
there
rather
than
being
compelled
to
'set
up
shop'
in
Afghanistan.
The
critical
commentary
would
have
us
believe
that
this
has
little
to
do
with
the
strength
of
the
Saudi
state,
its
opposition
to
al
Qaeda
or
al
Qaeda's
marginality
within
the
Kingdom.
Rather,
according
to
the
preponderate
view,
it
reflects
the
Saudi
government's
considerable
anxieties
over
al
Qaeda's
appeal
within
the
Kingdom,
indeed
a
limited
ability
to
effectively
confront
and
contain
it.
It
is
a
concern,
so
the
speculation
goes,
sufficient
to
prompt
the
government
to
pay
the
organization
to
ensure
that
it
operated
beyond
the
confines
of
the
Kingdom.
Yet,
the
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