Editor's Note:

The Saudi-American Forum wishes to thank Dr. Gause for permission to share this important contribution to the dialogue on US-Saudi relations with you.  This paper was originally published by the Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy. This is the second in a series.  

"The Approaching Turning Point: The Future of U.S. Relations with the Gulf States" is being provided to Saudi-American Forum members in weekly serials due to the length of the report.  

Debunking the "Saudis as Enemies" Thesis
by F. Gregory Gause, III

Tensions are inevitable in the Saudi-American relationship, and public support on both sides is at an all-time low. The relationship is bound to change. To some extent, the Bush Administration's focus on Iraq has postponed that change. Once the war with Iraq ends, the future of Saudi-American relations will certainly reemerge on the Administration's agenda. The question that both governments confront is where they want it to go. 

On the Saudi side, the answer is clear. Riyadh wants the relationship to continue, but with greater "political distance" than has been the case since 1991. Because of the American military presence in the Kingdom, and the extremely close association developed from the Gulf War, the Saudis have been implicated in a number of unpopular American policies, in the eyes of their own citizens and the region. With their stance on the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, they have made clear that they are seeking to rebalance the relationship, more on the model of the pre-1990 period. Then the U. S. military presence was "over the horizon" rather than in the Saudi backyard. There was strong cooperation then, but on a much less public level. The post-September 11th period demonstrates that the Saudis are more comfortable with that kind of distance in the relationship.

The debate on the American side about the future of the relationship is more vigorous. The first and most basic issue for Washington to decide is whether Saudi Arabia is an enemy of the United States, because of the interpretation of Islam it fosters. No one in government has put the issue so baldly, at least in public, but there are many outside of the government who have done so. Most notably, a French researcher invited to brief the Defense Policy Board in July 2002 called Saudi Arabia the "kernel of evil" in the Middle East and the country most responsible for terrorism.

The problem with the "Saudis as enemies" argument is that its proponents offer no convincing case for how to deal with a Saudi government defined as an enemy. The French researcher in the briefing mentioned above simply urged that the Saudis be "targeted" unless their behavior changed, without saying specifically how that should be done. Most importantly, such critics can identify no alternative ruling group in Arabia, with a realistic chance of unseating the Al Sa'ud, which would better conform to American interests. While the ruling family is divided on policy issues, as any political elite is, there are powerful elements within it that identify their own interests and the interests of their country to lie with the United States. They are the most likely source of changes in Saudi policy, on both foreign policy and domestic politics issues, which the United States seeks. The only organized social forces in the country with the popular following potentially to challenge the regime are religious dissidents and the official religious establishment. The "Saudis as enemies" argument defines the threat to the United States from Saudi Arabia as its religious ideology. As such, it would hardly be in the American interest to encourage the downfall of the Al Sa'ud, if the only group in a position to replace them would then be even more committed to that ideology.

Fantasies about American military occupation of the Saudi oil fields, encouraging the geographic break-up of the country, hardly deserve comment. The Saudi oil patch is in the eastern part of the country, bordering the Persian Gulf. The Saudi Shi'i minority, about 10% of the total population, is concentrated there. It would certainly not be in the interests of the United States to create a Shi'i statelet, with sectarian and cultural affinities with Iran, which would control 25% of the world's oil reserves. The alternative to an Iranian alliance for such a entity would be protectorate relations with Washington, obliging the U. S. to defend an area that would be the target of whatever government came to rule in the rest of Arabia, be it Saudi or not. Putting Iraq back together after the coming war will be hard enough for the United States. Taking on a permanent Shi'i protectorate in eastern Arabia, on top of Iraq, is simply ludicrous.

The bottom line on the "Saudis as enemies" argument is that, as emotionally satisfying as it might be for those who propound it, it does not offer a practical and achievable roadmap for advancing American interests. It is simply not sensible for the United States to make an enemy of a government, which sits on 25% of all the known oil reserves in the world, which controls the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and which seeks to cooperate with the United States on a number of key issues.

"The Approaching Turning Point: The Future of U.S. Relations with the Gulf States" is being provided to Saudi-American Forum members in weekly serials due to the length of the report.  

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

F. Gregory Gause, III is an Associate Professor of political science at the University of Vermont, and Director of the University's Middle East Studies Program. He was previously on the faculty of Columbia University (1987-1995) and was Fellow for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (1993-1994).

His research interests focus on the international politics of the Middle East, with a particular interest in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian/ Arabian Gulf. He has published two books: Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994) and Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence (Columbia University Press, 1990). His scholarly articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Middle East Journal, Washington Quarterly, Journal of International Affairs, Review of International Studies and in other journals and edited volumes. He has testified on Gulf issues before the Committee on International Relations of the U. S. House of Representatives.

Professor Gause received his Ph. D. in political science from Harvard University in 1987, and studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo and Middlebury College.