Executive Summary

While differences have existed, the bilateral relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has been durable and mutually beneficial. The foundation of the relationship is a combination of oil, economics and defense. In the post World War II Middle East, the first challenge was how to manage the collapse of imperialism and withdrawal of the British from the Gulf. The emergence of Egypt's Nasser complicated matters, as did the creation of Israel. Nasser and Soviet ambitions proved to be great threats to both the United States and the Kingdom. But these threats, like the threats posed by the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait were all managed successfully through U.S.-Saudi cooperation. Today, terrorism is the latest challenge to face the two allies.

It is not that the United States and Saudi Arabia share the same view of the world, nor have they shared one in the past. It is not that the pressures and challenges, both internal and external, facing the two nations are
identical, nor have they been. However, despite the differences, in the modern era of Middle East policy - since the end of World War II - the political relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has proven to be durable and mutually beneficial in confronting a host of challenges.

In this relatively short span of time, Americans and Saudis have confronted imperialism, Nasserism, Communism, Baathism, Khomeinism, Islamic militantism, and today, terrorism. In managing these challenges, US-Saudi cooperation has not always come without disagreements of varying size and scope, nor has either nation fully taken into account the concerns and pressures of their partner. This is particularly true when one throws in the other great "ism" into the mix - Zionism - which has without question led to sharp disagreements between these partners.

Despite differences of opinions, the Americans and Saudis wisely have agreed to disagree, and found common ground to meet and achieve common goals. Most notably these goals consist of promoting regional stability, supporting American regional interests, and ensuring Saudi defense. Paramount to all three of these goals, of course, is maintaining a stable and uninterrupted flow of petroleum, the lifeblood of both economies, from the Gulf region to the world's industrialized nations.

Even before the establishment of the US legation in Jeddah in 1942 and the historic meeting on the USS Quincy between King Abdulaziz and Franklin Roosevelt three years later, the US-Saudi economic links were well-established. Unlike the British imperial presence in the region, initially American interests in Saudi Arabia and the region were economically based and private sector driven. In the wake of World War II, however, much more was at stake. The Soviet threat, lingering but languishing British imperialism, the creation of Israel, and the Egyptian Free Officers revolution all posed serious challenges to the United States, the Kingdom, and the bilateral relationship.

The Soviet Union, ironically the first nation to recognize Saudi Arabia in 1926, and no less ironically an early oil exporter to Saudi Arabia, posed an ominous threat to the United States immediately after the end of World War II. Communism had already taken root in Eastern Europe and Asia, and the Americans feared Soviet entry into the Middle East. Soviet moves in Iran and support of Israel were well documented, and Americans felt that further encroachment on the resource-rich region could be catastrophic. While the Soviet threat did not initially consume the Kingdom to the degree it did the Americans, ideologically godless Communism had little appeal to the Saudis -- even less so in light of the fact that the Soviets had brutally imposed the stamp of their atheistic rule and institutions on millions of the Kingdom's fellow Muslims in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Americans knew imperialism was on the wane, but the British presence was still strong throughout the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf. Though the Americans were well aware of the unpopularity of the British presence in the region, the British guaranteed oil would flow to the West and helped maintain a semblance of political stability. The Saudis, however, resented the British, and felt that British support of their Hashemite rivals in Baghdad and Amman, as well as influence in Iran, Kuwait, Oman, and the Trucial States was menacing. From an Arab perspective, the British exploited the region's oil, and profited at the expense of the region. In 1956, the British also joined forces with Israel and France to invade the Arab world's most populous country.

The creation of Israel in May of 1948 further complicated matters for the Saudis and Americans. Israel was anathema to the Saudi government as it was to every other Arab state. In addition to concern over the plight of the Palestinians, many Saudis thought Zionism threatening and foreign-imposed; Prince Faisal equated it with Communism, another loathed foreign ideology trying to take root in the region. The United States recognized Israel without Saudi consultation, which the Saudis felt violated a February 1945 promise Franklin Roosevelt had made to King Abdelaziz in which the former conveyed to the latter that he would undertake no major decision with regard to the Palestine Question without first consulting the Saudi monarch.

President Truman's famous quote about having no Arab constituents while having many Jewish ones, which made his decision to recognize Israel appear entirely domestically motivated, incensed the Saudis. Without revisiting the merits of this decision, Truman made a profound point about domestic political pressures on American foreign policy, being that the proverbial squeaky wheel gets the grease. To this day, this concept has not been fully understood by many in the Arab world.

The July 23, 1952 Egyptian Free Officers Revolution had a profound impact on the region, and on the US-Saudi relationship. Among other goals, Gamal Abdel-Nasser wanted to eliminate the British presence from Egypt, and, in calling for increased unity in the Arab and Islamic world, reduce Western influence in the region. While Nasser's anti-imperialist rhetoric appealed to many Saudis and had resonance with members of the royal family, in time both the Saudis and Americans concluded that Nasser was attempting to create a pan-Arab nation in his own making. As oil was one of the weapons in Nasser's pan-Arab quiver, the United States naturally found the charismatic Egyptian a threat. His popularity and evolving political orientation would make him dangerous to the Kingdom.

Thus, in the 1950's the US-Saudi relationship faced a variety of challenges. Arguably, however, it was Nasser and his actions in regard to Communism, imperialism, and Israel that would strengthen American-Saudi ties and increase the importance of the relationship. Saudi Arabia would prove to be
the most important political Arab ally of the United States.

In the course of the 1950's, the British regional influence sagged, particularly after it took provocative measures (or interpreted as such by the Saudis) to settle boundary disputes with the Kingdom and its ill-fated and politically suicidal military alliance with Israel in 1956. In both cases, the Americans sided with the Kingdom at the expense of the British. By cooperating with the Kingdom and its other regional allies (primarily Iran), the Americans displaced the British as the guarantor of the flow of oil to the West.

Soviet arms and aid to Nasser naturally angered and alarmed the United States. The formation of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria, on one hand, and the Iraqi revolution, and the failure of the American-initiated Omega and Alpha Plans, tilted the region toward Nasser and to the left of the political spectrum. The Omega plan had sought to undermine Nasser's regional position, while Alpha had attempted to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The aggressive Egyptian propaganda machine relentlessly attacked Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

At this precarious time, Saudi-American cooperation proved mutually beneficial. Saudi oil resources were important to the United States and vital to the America's allies, and the money it generated was vital to the Kingdom. Politically, the Kingdom assured the United States of a friendly and powerful ally in the region, and served as a bulwark against the Nasser-Communist forces. US assistance, particularly military assistance, greatly helped the Kingdom during this difficult period.

The decision to supply military assistance to the Kingdom was first made by Franklin Roosevelt. During World War II, the Kingdom was made eligible for lend-lease assistance. In the post-World War II world, the Israel factor complicated this decision despite Nasser and the Soviets. While Congress embraced the Eisenhower Doctrine, which called for providing economic and military assistance to Middle Eastern nations opposing Communism, it forced the Administration to accept a provision guaranteeing safe passage of Israeli
ships through the Gulf of Aqaba. Pro-Israeli forces protested each shipment of arms to the Kingdom. Domestic pressures clearly impaired the level of assistance, and also contributed significantly to the decision to supply US military assistance to Israel.

This highlights a continuing challenge to US Administrations and lawmakers in Congress as to how to provide arms to the Saudis (or Egypt today) to bolster the Kingdom's ability to defend itself against numerous potential foes while not alarming the supporters of Israel, who fear these weapons will be used offensively against the Jewish state.

The problems posed by Nasser continued into the 1960's, as did American assistance to the Kingdom. Despite Nasser's allegations, the Kingdom made its own strategic decisions, even ones not popular with the Americans, such as the decision not to renew the American lease to the air base at Dhahran. In 1962, rhetoric turned to military action in Yemen, where Nasser sent troops to bolster the Republican forces, while the Kingdom supported the Yemeni royalists.

The Middle East would be shaken up significantly in 1967. Militarily, Nasser and the Arab armies were routed by Israel. However, the biggest casualty politically was the death of Nasserism. While Nasser would live until 1970, he spent all his political capital in 1967, and his regional influence was largely destroyed. In fact, so great was the loss, Nasser was forced to accept assistance from Saudi Arabia. Nasser also had to listen to, as opposed to lecture or demonize, King Faisal, now in a stronger position regionally than Nasser. "These people (the Russians) are atheists and Abdel Nasser's continued relationship with them will harm him greatly. The Russians do not wish him or Egypt either prosperity or success," King Faisal said to a Nasser aide in a comment which must have greatly pleased the United States.

In October 1973, the region was again altered by an Arab-Israeli war. However, the results of this war were different. Egypt and the Arabs regained military respectability on the battlefield, which allowed Anwar Sadat to pursue a peace treaty with Israel. Politically and economically, however,