The Saudi-American Forum wishes to thank Dr. Gause for permission to share this important contribution to the dialogue on US-Saudi relations with you.  This paper was originally published by the Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy. 

"The Approaching Turning Point: The Future of U.S. Relations with the Gulf States" is being provided to Saudi-American Forum members in weekly serials due to the length of the report.  A complete version is posted to the Saudi-American Forum library.

The U. S. and Saudi Domestic Politics: Striking the Balance
By F. Gregory Gause, III

The issues of terrorist financing and the "battle of ideas" in the Muslim world are, at least in part, foreign policy issues for the Saudis, and thus areas where American pressure can have positive effects. For the United States, the more difficult question we face is the extent to which we seek to make domestic political changes inside Saudi Arabia the centerpiece of our bilateral relationship. The underlying question is how much of the U. S.-Saudi agenda should focus on greater political freedoms, educational reform, women's rights and, most sensitive of all these sensitive issues, the official Saudi interpretation of Islam, "Wahhabism."

The argument that the United States must push the Saudis for substantial changes in their own domestic political and social life is based upon two premises, both of which are flawed. The first is that Saudi Arabia, with its particularly narrow interpretation of Islam, is the wellspring of Islamist terrorism. The prima facie case for this premise, in the immediate aftermath of September 11, was strong. Bin Ladin is a Saudi, 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis, and the "Wahhabi" interpretation of Islam is well known for its narrowness. However, like most single cause explanations, the contention that Saudi Arabia is the root of Islamist extremism falls apart on closer examination.

The ideological origins of bin Ladin's toxic mix of fundamentalism and violence are not exclusively Saudi or "Wahhabi." Rather, the roots of bin Ladinism can be found in a mix of extremist offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the experience of "jihad" against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980's, and general region-wide anti-Americanism. The Brotherhood contribution, represented by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Egypt's "Islamic Group" and bin Ladin's second-in-command in al-Qa'ida, is the idea that most Muslims, including Muslim governments, are not following the true path of Islam. Therefore, they can be considered apostates from Islam and subject to violent attack. The Afghan experience convinced bin Ladin and his followers that armed resistance by a small group of the faithful can achieve great, even miraculous, political success. When the "Afghan Arabs" failed to bring down governments in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, bin Ladin changed his focus toward the United States. This strategic move broadened his appeal, allowing him to tap into broader sentiments of anti-Americanism (fed by anti-Israeli feeling).

Bin Ladin's message appealed to many Saudis. Undoubtedly the narrowness and intolerance of difference characteristic of official Saudi Islam contributed to the receptivity among these Saudis to his message. But it is also important to remember that it also appealed to many Afghans, Algerians, Egyptians, Jordanians, Kuwaitis, Moroccans, Pakistanis, Palestinians, Yemenis, etc. Al-Qa'ida's membership cuts across state and ethnic lines. Unfortunately, bin Ladin's appeal is not limited to those raised and educated in the official Saudi version of Islam. It is more political than simply religious or doctrinal. Indeed, in its political message, it runs directly against official interpretations of Islam in Saudi Arabia.

In terms of politics, "Wahhabism" has shed its revolutionary roots and become a state ideology. It now counsels obedience to Muslim rulers and political quietism. "Wahhabism" in its current incarnation could disappear, but as long as the political circumstances that give rise to the bin Ladinist current in the Muslim world persist, that would not solve the problem of anti-American terrorism from the Muslim world. Quashing or changing "Wahhabism" in Saudi Arabia is not the silver bullet that will bring victory in the war on terrorism. In fact, the ideological atmosphere in the Kingdom would be much less tolerant of bin Ladinist ideas if the "Wahhabi" religious establishment were much more vigorous, particularly in confronting its members who are sympathetic to bin Ladin.

The second flawed premise behind assertions that the United States should demand major domestic political, social, and religious changes in Saudi Arabia is that the Saudi regime is teetering on the edge of dissolution. Only with fundamental reforms, this argument runs, can the Saudis survive. Since they seem incapable of instituting these reforms themselves, the United States must force them to do so.

This is just not so. The Saudis have a number of serious domestic problems, including a decaying social services infrastructure, rising unemployment, and a blocked political system. The United States can, judiciously and carefully, prod the Saudis to take steps that will improve the prospects for political stability down the line. But right now, the Al Saud face no serious challenge to their rule in Arabia. By the end of the 1990s, they had rolled up the domestic manifestations of Islamist and bin Ladinist opposition. After September 11, they reasserted their control over the religious establishment in the country, and even rallied former opponents to their side. Through skillful oil diplomacy (and timely increases in world oil demand), they were able to push oil prices up over 100% from late 1998, when prices briefly fell to $10 per barrel, thus averting a fiscal crisis.

The other concern is the uncertain position of Crown Prince Abdullah, who still lacks the formal authority of kingship. The ruling family is struggling with the difficult situation of a largely incapacitated king and a crown prince who has day-to-day governing responsibilities. While Crown Prince Abdullah is clearly the major decision-maker in Saudi Arabia, his authority is not absolute. Policy initiatives launched by him, in some cases, remain bogged down in the Saudi bureaucracy. This indicates that, on major issues, he still needs to sustain a consensus among the senior princes to carry through serious policy changes. However, there are no signs of a major public split among the senior princes or a struggle over succession when King Fahd dies, the kinds of rifts at the top that could call into question regime stability. In fact, the Saudi regime is stable now and for the immediate future. There is time to deal with domestic social, economic and political problems.

"The Approaching Turning Point: The Future of U.S. Relations with the Gulf States" is being provided to Saudi-American Forum members in weekly serials due to the length of the report.  A complete version is posted to the Saudi-American Forum library.

His research interests focus on the international politics of the Middle East, with a particular interest in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian/ Arabian Gulf. He has published two books: Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994) and Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence (Columbia University Press, 1990). His scholarly articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Middle East Journal, Washington Quarterly, Journal of International Affairs, Review of International Studies and in other journals and edited volumes. He has testified on Gulf issues before the Committee on International Relations of the U. S. House of Representatives.

Professor Gause received his Ph. D. in political science from Harvard University in 1987, and studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo and Middlebury College.