Debunking
the "Saudis as
Enemies" Thesis
by F. Gregory Gause,
III
Tensions
are inevitable in the
Saudi-American
relationship, and
public support on both
sides is at an
all-time low. The
relationship is bound
to change. To some
extent, the Bush
Administration's focus
on Iraq has postponed
that change. Once the
war with Iraq ends,
the future of
Saudi-American
relations will
certainly reemerge on
the Administration's
agenda. The question
that both governments
confront is where they
want it to go.
| On
the Saudi
side, the
answer is
clear. Riyadh
wants the
relationship
to continue,
but with
greater
"political
distance"
than has been
the case since
1991. Because
of the
American
military
presence in
the Kingdom,
and the
extremely
close
association
developed from
the Gulf War,
the Saudis
have been
implicated in
a number of
unpopular
American
policies, in
the eyes of
their own
citizens and
the region.
With their
stance on the
Afghanistan
and Iraq wars,
they have made
clear that
they are
seeking to
rebalance the
relationship,
more on the
model of the
pre-1990
period. Then
the U. S.
military
presence was
"over the
horizon"
rather than in
the Saudi
backyard.
There was
strong
cooperation
then, but on a
much less
public level.
The
post-September
11th period
demonstrates
that the
Saudis are
more
comfortable
with that kind
of distance in
the
relationship. |
Because
of the
American
military
presence in
the Kingdom,
and the
extremely
close
association
developed from
the Gulf War,
the Saudis
have been
implicated in
a number of
unpopular
American
policies, in
the eyes of
their own
citizens and
the region.
|
The
debate on the American
side about the future
of the relationship is
more vigorous. The
first and most basic
issue for Washington
to decide is whether
Saudi Arabia is an
enemy of the United
States, because of the
interpretation of
Islam it fosters. No
one in government has
put the issue so
baldly, at least in
public, but there are
many outside of the
government who have
done so. Most notably,
a French researcher
invited to brief the
Defense Policy Board
in July 2002 called
Saudi Arabia the
"kernel of
evil" in the
Middle East and the
country most
responsible for
terrorism.
The
problem with the
"Saudis as
enemies" argument
is that its proponents
offer no convincing
case for how to deal
with a Saudi
government defined as
an enemy. The French
researcher in the
briefing mentioned
above simply urged
that the Saudis be
"targeted"
unless their behavior
changed, without
saying specifically
how that should be
done. Most
importantly, such
critics can identify
no alternative ruling
group in Arabia, with
a realistic chance of
unseating the Al Sa'ud,
which would better
conform to American
interests. While the
ruling family is
divided on policy
issues, as any
political elite is,
there are powerful
elements within it
that identify their
own interests and the
interests of their
country to lie with
the United States.
They are the most
likely source of
changes in Saudi
policy, on both
foreign policy and
domestic politics
issues, which the
United States seeks.
The only organized
social forces in the
country with the
popular following
potentially to
challenge the regime
are religious
dissidents and the
official religious
establishment. The
"Saudis as
enemies" argument
defines the threat to
the United States from
Saudi Arabia as its
religious ideology. As
such, it would hardly
be in the American
interest to encourage
the downfall of the Al
Sa'ud, if the only
group in a position to
replace them would
then be even more
committed to that
ideology.
|
...it
would hardly
be in the
American
interest to
encourage the
downfall of
the Al Sa'ud,
if the only
group in a
position to
replace them
would then be
even more
committed to
that ideology.
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Fantasies
about American
military occupation of
the Saudi oil fields,
encouraging the
geographic break-up of
the country, hardly
deserve comment. The
Saudi oil patch is in
the eastern part of
the country, bordering
the Persian Gulf. The
Saudi Shi'i minority,
about 10% of the total
population, is
concentrated there. It
would certainly not be
in the interests of
the United States to
create a Shi'i
statelet, with
sectarian and cultural
affinities with Iran,
which would control
25% of the world's oil
reserves. The
alternative to an
Iranian alliance for
such a entity would be
protectorate relations
with Washington,
obliging the U. S. to
defend an area that
would be the target of
whatever government
came to rule in the
rest of Arabia, be it
Saudi or not. Putting
Iraq back together
after the coming war
will be hard enough
for the United States.
Taking on a permanent
Shi'i protectorate in
eastern Arabia, on top
of Iraq, is simply
ludicrous.
The
bottom line on the
"Saudis as
enemies" argument
is that, as
emotionally satisfying
as it might be for
those who propound it,
it does not offer a
practical and
achievable roadmap for
advancing American
interests. It is
simply not sensible
for the United States
to make an enemy of a
government, which sits
on 25% of all the
known oil reserves in
the world, which
controls the Muslim
holy cities of Mecca
and Medina, and which
seeks to cooperate
with the United States
on a number of key
issues.
"The
Approaching Turning
Point: The Future of
U.S. Relations with
the Gulf States"
is being provided to
Saudi-American Forum
members in weekly
serials due to the
length of the report.
A complete version
is posted to the Saudi-American
Forum library.
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